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Many attempts to understand the conversion process have been guided by Lofland and Stark's 
(1965) "process-modeL" We examine ten case studies of the conversion process in diverse groups in 
order to specify the conditions under which the Lofland·Stark model applies. Several components 
of the model are rejected for conceptual reasons. Other components are to be found in some types 
of groups but not in others. Only "formation of affective bonds with group members" and "intensive 
interaction with group members" seem to be indispensible prerequisites for conversion. Thus, any 
group which is to successfully convert people must be structured so as to foster interaction among 
group members. Because there is no one process·model that can accurately account for all cases of 
conversion, the process· model approach should be abandoned in favor of "subjective" and 
"organizational" approaches to understanding conversion. 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past ten years, the sociological study of religion has been characterized by 
a dramatic increase in the amount of attention paid to the analysis of the so-called "new 
religions" (Long and Hadden, 1979:280). This increased concern with religious innovation 
has, in tum, given rise to increased interest among sociologists in the phenomenon of 
religious conversion. Because the "new religions" are often faced with the need to recruit 
new members from a population whose world views are often quite different from their 
own, the desire to understand these new religious movements has almost inevitably led 
to an interest in understanding the processes by which they recruit prospective members 
and by which they encourage them to renounce old beliefs and embrace new ones. 
Many attempts to comprehend the conversion process have been guided explicitly 
or implicitly by the "process model" used by Lofland and Stark (1965) in their case study 
of the Unification Church when it was a relatively unknown sect struggling for survival 
*This is an extensively revised version of a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for the Scientific 
Study of Religion held in Baltimore in October, 1981. We are indebted to James T. Richardson, Robert Balch and 
Melinda Bollar Wagner for their helpful suggestions. 
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on the West Coast. Based on their analysis of life histories of various early Unification 
Church members, Lofland and Stark formulated a "value-added model" delineating seven 
logically ordered stages through which people must pass if they are to become converts. 
According to these authors, 
For conversion, a person must (U experience enduring, acutely felt tensions, (2) within a religious 
problem solving perspective, (3) which leads him to defme himself as a religious seeker, (4) encountering 
the (cult) at a turning point in his life, (5) wherein an affective bond is formed (or preexists) with one 
or more converts, (6) where extra-cult attachments are absent or neutralized, and (7) where if he is to 
become a deployable agent, he is exposed to intensive interaction (1965:87 4). 
When Lofland and Stark published their process-model in 1965, they were exploring 
virgin territory, but today there exist a number of case studies of the conversion process, 
many of which have directly addressed the issue of the validity of the Lofland-Stark model. 
In the decade and a half that have passed since the formulation of the Lofland-Stark model, 
a number of researchers have addressed the question of the model's empirical adequacy 
by studying the conversion process as it takes place in such diverse groups as Hare Krishna 
(Judah, 1974), Divine Light Mission (Downton, 1980), Nichiren Shoshu Buddhism (Snow 
and Phillips, 1980) a UFO cult (Balch and Taylor, 1978), a metaphysical church given 
the pseudonym, "Church of the Sun" (Lynch, 1978), a fundamentalist Christian group 
called "Crusade House" (Austin, 1977), a group of Jesus People known as "Christ 
Communal Organization" (Richardson et aL, 1978, 1979), Mormons (Seggar and Kunz, 
1972), and a Mormon schismatic group called the Levites (Bear, 1978). Some of these 
researchers have conceived of their studies explicitly as tests of the Lofland-Stark model; 
others have applied the model in a post-hoc fashion as a means of illuminating their data. 
It should be noted here that Lofland and Stark never made any claims for their model 
as a general model of conversion applicable to all groups. In fact, Lofland has complained 
(1978:21) that too many researchers have tried to apply his model to the conversion setting 
they were studying rather than develop their own qualitative process-models of conversion. 
In spite of such disclaimers, the Lofland-Stark model has often been treated as if it were 
intended to be a general model of the conversion process. 
One of the more recent - and more thoughtful - attempts to assess the general 
validity of the Lofland-Stark model has been provided by Snow and Phillips (1980). Based 
on their observations of adherents of Nichiren Shoshu Buddhism, Snow and Phillips argue 
that the Lofland-Stark model is not generally applicable. Of the seven proposed 
prerequisites for conversion, Snow and Phillips found that only one, intensive interaction 
with other converts, seemed essential to the conversion process as it took place among 
adherents to Nichiren Shoshu. They go on to argue that the conversion process may well 
be different in different kinds of groups and call for further study of the extent to which 
conversion "varies across groups differing in ideology, organization and public reaction" 
(1980:444). Baer (1978:293) and Richardson (1978:320) have suggested that the conversion 
process will be different in different organizational settings. Pilarzyk (1978) has contrasted 
the process of "conversion" in ISKON to the process "alternation" in Divine Light Mission 
and has pointed out the relationship between these differences and differences in the 
structure of the two groups. 
Perhaps, then, instead of asking whether the Lofland-Stark model is applicable, we 
should be asking about when it is applicable. Enough case studies in different group 
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settings have now been conducted "~ anable us to draw some conclusions about the kinds 
of organizational contexts that seem to fit the model and the kinds of organizational 
contexts in which the model does not seem appropriate. Such an analysis of the 
organizational context of the conversion process should supply us with fresh insight about 
the dynamics of the conversion process. 
To engage in the kind of analysis we are calling for, comparative data on conversion 
are necessary. Several researchers (Gordon, 1978; Pilarzyk, 1978; Gerlach and Hine, 1970) 
have tried to obtain such information by conducting research in several different group 
settings. Here we employ a different strategy for obtaining comparative data. In this 
paper we compare the results of ten case studies in the process-model tradition (including 
the orginal Unification Church study) in an attempt to see what conclusions we can draw 
about the nature of the conversion process as it occurs in different types of religious groups. 
We begin by outlining the most salient differences among the groups described in the 
case studies we examine. Second, we discuss some of the theoretical and methodological 
weaknesses of the process-model approach as it is applied in these case studies. Third, 
we examine the case studies to see to what extent and under what conditions the seven 
prerequisites to conversion proposed by Lofland and Stark seem to be valid. Fourth, we 
review the results of our analysis in the light of theoretical and empirical work stemming 
from other traditions of conversion research, Finally, we sketch some conclusions about. 
the dynamics of the conversion process and about the directions that future conversion 
research might profitably take. 
THE CASES 
The ten cases we compare represent the total population of case studies of the 
conversion process of which we are aware that report enough information relevant to all 
seven tenets of the Lofland-Stark model to allow us to pass judgment on the extent to 
which the case in question fits the model.• We make no assumptions about the extent 
to which the movements studied in these ten case studies are representative of the total 
population of new religious movements in the United States. Given our purpose here, 
it is less important to have a representative sample than it is to have sufficient variation 
within the sample to allow us to observe the conditions und~r which the model being 
examined does and does not hold true (See Zetterberg, 1954:55-58). 
As it turns out, there is quite a bit of variation to be found among the ten religious 
groups considered here. Three of ten cases studied deal with conversion to "Eastern 
religions" (Hare Krishna, Nichiren Shoshu and the Divine Light Mission); five deal with 
groups that derive from the Christian tradition (Christ Communal Organization, Crusade 
House, Mormons, Levi~s and Unification Church); the remaining studies deal with groups 
whose ideology could perhaps best be described as "occult" (The Church of the Sun and 
UFO cult). 
The groups considered here vary along several other dimensions as well. Some of the 
groups advocate for their members a communal lifestyle in which most if not all member 
activities are conducted within the confines of the group, while others are considerably 
less "greedy," allowing members more unsupervised contact with non-members and greater 
access to participation in roles not sponsored by the group in question. Related to this 
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"communal vs. non-communal" dimension is another dimension along which these groups 
vary: the degree to which affiliation with. a group tends to involve a radical discontinuity 
in social roles. Some groups (Hare Krishna, for example) encourage recruits to leave their 
families, jobs, educational institutions, etc., to take on a new round of life which is centered 
around the goals of the organizaion, while other groups, such as Nichiren Shoshu, do not 
see their goals as being inherently in conflict with the performance of other roles. Groups 
which encourage discontinuity of social roles are often, but not always, the same groups 
which sponsor communal life styles among their members. 
The groups also vary with regard to the way they are perceived by the general public. 
Membership in certain of these groups, involving as it does a deviant lifestyle, often carries 
with it a certain amount of stigma, while membership in others does not bring with it 
any diminishing of "respectability." A distinction must be made here between deviant 
lifestyles and deviant world views. 2 Members of the Church of the Sun, for example, often 
espouse beliefs which resemble an "occult smorgasbord" (Lynch, 1978:96), but they live 
in middle-class families, hold down middle-class jobs and continue to be respectable 
members of the "establishment." It is interesthg to note here that the groups that are 
relatively more stigmatized are the same groups which advocate radical discontinuity 
in social roles. It may be that it is the tendency for members of these groups to eschew 
traditional social roles that leads them to be stigmatized, or it may be that stigmatization 
(as labelling theorists might have it) reinforces tendencies to abandon accepted social roles. 
Finally, the groups discussed here seem to differ with regard to the degree to which 
the ideology of the group is at odds with the world view members espoused before contact 
with the groups. Travisano (1970:600) distinguishes between two types of identity change. 
"Conversion" involves a "radical" reorganization of identity, meaning, and life, while 
"alternation" involves a less drastic change of world-view or identity, a variation on a 
theme as opposed to the substitution of a new melody. Recruitment to some of the groups 
in which we are interested (the Mormons for example) seems to involve for most recruits 
a change that Travisano would call''alternation,'' while recruitment to other groups, such 
as the Divine Precepts cult, seems to more often involve "conversion." Of the several 
variables we are working with, "degree of identity change" has presented us with the 
greatest difficulties in classification. Many of the cases do not present sufficient evidence 
for us to have a great deal of confidence in the way we have treated them here. And even 
if the researchers on whose work we depend had paid more attention to this variable, 
the problem of operationalizing it would still be formidable. 
Table 1 displays our classification of the groups discussed here with regard to the 
several dimensions discussed above. In all cases, we have relied on published ethnographic 
information supplied by the authors of the case studies we are examining as the primary 
basis for our classifications. Note that we have treated all the variables discussed above 
as dichotomous. This almost certainly involves some degree of distortion and 
oversimplification. Clearly, a variable like "degree of identity change" is better represented 
as a continuum than as a dichotomy, and much the same could be said for the other 
variables as well. We have persisted in treating these variables as dichotomous for two 
reasons. First, the small number of cases with which we must work does not allow us 
to make use of finer distinctions. Second, our classifications in some cases are based on 
such limited information that to attempt to draw finer distinctions would be foolhardy. 
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Table 1: Variation Among the Conversion Cases 
1.1 Does the group in question advocate for its members a communal lifestyle? 
Communal 
Christ Communal Organizationa 
Hare Krighna 
UFO Cult 
Non-CoDIDunal 
Church of the Sun 
c Crusade House d 
Divine kight Mission 
Levites 
Nichiren Shoshu 
1.2 Does membership in the group in question involve a radical discontinuity in 
social roles? 
Radical Discontinuity 
Christ Communal Organization 
Divine Light Mission 
Hare Krishna 
UFO Cult 
Unification Church 
More Moderate Change 
Church of the Sun 
CrusadefHouse 
Levites 
Mormons 
Nichiren Shoshu 
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1. 3 Are members of the group in question regarded as "deviant" by the "general public?" 
Stigmatized 
Christ Communal OrganizationS 
Divine Light Mission 
Hare Krishna 
UFO Cult 
Unification Church 
Non-Stigmatized 
Church of thehSun 
Crusade House 
Levites 
Mormons 
Nichiren Shoshu 
1.4 Do members of the group in question see themselves as having moved from one 
universe of discourse to another? 
Conversion 
Church of the Sun 
Divine Light Mission 
Hare Krishna 
Nichiren Shoshu 
Unification Church 
Alternation 
Christ Communyl Organization1 
Cru.sade House 
Levites 
Mormons 
UFO Cult 
a. At the time of the fieldwork conducted by Richardson et al., 1979, Christ 
Communal Organization lived communally; today most members have apparently 
abandoned the communal lifestyle. 
b. Although the lifestyle here would not usually be described as "communal," 
members' daily round of life is devoted to group activities and group goals 
(Balch and Taylor, 1978). 
c . Members live in a common residence, but the lifestyle here seems better described 
as co-operative than communal (Austin, 1977:283). 
d. About 25% of the members of Divine Light Mission live communally. 
e. Some members live in a communal setting but most do not (Baer, 1978:280). 
f. For those who live communally the change in lifestyle can be assumed to have been 
greater than for those who do not live communally (Baer, 1978:280). 
g. Here one gets the impression that it is members' lifestyles rather than their 
beliefs which are regarded as deviant (Richardson, et al., 1978, 1979). 
h. Austin (1977: 283) refers to the group as "deviant," but our reading of his 
evidence suggests that he is being a little over-dramatic here. 
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i. Members seem to view their conversions as a radical change, but for many this 
"radical change" represents a return to fundamentalist Christian beliefs 
(Richardson et al., 1978). 
j. For approximately half the members included in Austin's (1977) sample, perceived 
change appears to have been quite minimal. For the other half, the degree of 
perceived change seems to have been somewhat greater. 
Table 1 may give the reader the impression that the organization of the groups we 
discuss is static. This is clearly not the case. Religious organizations - like other 
organizations - evolve over time, but this evolution is impossible to capture in the type 
of classificatory project in which we are engaged here. To take only one example, Christ 
Communal Organization was clearly a communal organization when Richardson et al, 
(1978, 1979) did their fieldwork. Today, however, most members of the CCO do not live 
communally. In order to classify groups in such circumstances we have treated them as 
if they were frozen in the ethnographic present. In other words, our classificatory scheme 
treats each group as if it has not changed since the research on the basis of which we 
have classified it was conducted. 
Table 1 may also give the impression that the groups we discuss here are monolithic 
in structure. Again, this is not the case. For example, some members of the Levites live 
communally but most do not (Baer, 1978:280). In such cases, we have tried to place the 
group in question in the category that best describes the experience of most group members 
at the time the research on that particular group was conducted. 
The small number of cases with which we are working here makes any kind of 
sophisticated quantitative analysis of our data unfeasable. All we will be able to do is 
examine each stage of the Lofland-Stark model, indicate how many of the cases in question 
conform to the model's prediction and make a few broad descriptive statements about 
any characteristics of the groups which conform to the model's predictions that seem 
to distinguish them from those which do not conform. 
The small number of cases with which we must deal is not the only methodological 
problem that confronts us. Another major difficulty is that we are attempting to compare 
studies which were not conducted with an eye to facilitating comparison. Each author 
has used his own operational definitions and his own measures for the various variables 
singled out for examination by Lofland and Stark. We are often forced to accept an author's 
assessment of whether or not the case he is examining conforms to what would be predicted 
by the model at face value, since we are not always provided with enough empirical data 
to enable us to evaluate the author's assessment. 
PROBLEMS WITH PROCESS-MODELS 
Other problems with the approach we have employed in our analysis here stem from 
methodological shortcomings endemic to the process-model tradition. One of these has 
to do with the question of level of analysis. Conversion is usually conceived of theoretically 
as an individual phenomenon. The Lofland-Stark model explains conversion in terms of 
the background characteristics of individuals and in terms of situational factors that 
impinge upon the lives of individuals. In spite of this, our study involves the religious 
group as the unit of analysis. It is clearly not quite kosher to test a model predicting 
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the behavior of individuals by examining data collected about the groups with which the 
individuals may have affiliated themselves. 
Our reason for proceeding in this manner is, of course, that we have no choice. From 
Lofland and Stark on, researchers on conversion to new religions have tended to focus 
on the group as the unit of analysis, on the apparent assumption that all individuals who 
join a particular group being with the same background characteristics, join for the same 
reasons and go through the same changes. There is good reason to doubt that this is 
always so. Austin's study of Crusade House (1977:284-85) makes it clear that for only 
about half of the "converts" studied did involvement with Crusade House actually involve 
a drastic change in behavior (see also Richardson, 1978). Gordon (1974) has provided us 
with a cogent exposition on the varieties of identity transformation that take place among 
the "Jesus People." Lofland and Skonovd (1981) have recently argued for the existence 
of six "conversion motifs," several of which could easily characterize converts participating 
in the same group. Wallis' (1977) discussion of recruitment in the Scientology movement 
shows a special sensitivity to the differences in motivations, experiences and movement 
career patterns among recruits. Pilarzyk (1978), in his account of conversion in ISKON 
and Divine Light Mission also is careful to point out the differences that characterize 
the experiences of recruits to the same group. Balch (1980) has advised us on the basis 
of his study of a UFO cult not to be too quick to jump to the conclusion that all those 
who publically perform the role of convert have totally embraced that role. It is our 
contention that the implicit assumption that all members of a given group have all 
undergone the same essential transformation process and can therefore be regarded as 
a single unit for the purposes of analysis constitutes one of the major weaknesses of the 
typical case study of the conversion process. 
Furthermore, focusing on the group rather than the individual as the unit of analysis 
implies that conversion is a one-event phenomenon. Richardson and his associates 
(Richardson, 1977, 1980, 1981, 1982; Richardson and Stewart, 1978; Richardson, et aL, 
1979) have argued that conversion is often a multi-event phenomenon and that, for a solid 
understanding of the conversion process, we must pay attention to "conversion 
trajectories." If we focus on the group as the unit of analysis we eliminate the possibility 
of tracing the individual from one group to another as he or she pursues a "conversion 
career." 
Related to the level of analysis problem is the failure on the part of many researchers 
to attempt to actually measure in any way the extent to which a change in identity has 
actually taken place. In most cases it is simply assumed that affiliation with a group 
necessarily entails identity transformation. Recruitment is understood to imply conversion. 
Therefore, what purport to be studies of converts to religious ideologies are actually studies 
of recruits to religious groups. But as Zygmunt (1972) has forcefully argued, recruitment 
and conversion are two separate processes. Judah (1974:169) has suggested that individuals 
may become committed to participation in the Hare Krishna movement long before they 
really comprehend or embrace the group's ideology. Balch (1980) has shown that active 
participants in the UFO cult harbored persistent doubts about the validity of the world 
view espoused by its leaders. Strauss (1976, 1979) has also shown that people who have 
chosen to play the role of convert are not necessarily the "true believers" that outsiders 
take them to be. 
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This puts the researcher in the peculiar position of trying to account for something 
which may not have taken place. Seggar and Kunz's (1972) study of "conversion" to 
Mormonism, for example presents no evidence that could convince the reader that the 
outlooks of their respondents have changed. Is it, then, newsworthy when they find that 
the Lofland-Stark process-model, designed to account for conversion, does not seem to 
have much heuristic value in explaining a change in organizational affiliation? 
Another methodological weakness of conversion studies has been alluded to by such 
researchers as Snow and Phillips (1980), Beckford (1978), Taylor (1976), Berger and 
Luckmann (1967) and by Lofland himself (1978). Most conversion studies rely for their 
evidence of the factors conditioning the conversion process on accounts collected from 
converts after the fact. The problem with this is that, since conversion is generally 
conceptualized as a radical reorganization of experience, the converts' accounts of their 
past experiences may be best seen as products of their new identity-transformation process 
rather than as objective reports on the antecedents of the conversion process. Converts, 
in an attempt to reinterpret to themselves, to one another, and to outsiders the content 
of life before conversion, often construct testimonials of the "I once was lost, but now 
I'm found" variety. Beckford (1978:260) has argued that conversion accounts should be 
understood as creative constructions on the part of the individuals within a collectivity 
to present their experiences in a manner that will be appealing and convincing to others. 
If accounts are to be seen as constructions in the present rather than as recollections 
of the past, we must be skeptical of studies which take such accounts at face value as 
statements of the motives and events which actually led to conversion. 
This does not necessarily mean however that we should be equally skeptical of all 
aspects of accounts. Respondents' recollections can often be corroborated by other 
methods. It strikes us that we might be able to place somewhat more credence in converts' 
recollections of actual events in their lives than in their recollections of motives or feeling 
states. Thus we would be inclined to make more of a statement that a convert came into 
contact with a group shortly after moving to San Francisco that we would make of the 
statement that this marked a period of great tension in the converts' life. 
Because of the above mentioned weaknesses in the studies we examine and because 
of difficulties we faced in comparing the studies, any findings drawn from them must 
be interpreted with extreme caution. Nevertheless, we proceed in our analysis with the 
conviction that conclusions drawn from an analysis of imperfect studies will still be useful. 
to scholars trying to devise ways to improve our state of knowledge in this area. 
TESTING THE LOFLAND-STARK MODEL 
Table 2 presents in schematic form our findings about the extent to which the cases 
we have examined at second hand seem to conform to the Lofland-Stark model. 
TENSIONS 
Most of the studies inspected reveal that converts admit to experiencing high levels of 
tension, but there are good reasons for refusing to accept this evidence at face value. The 
main problem here is that we have no way of knowing whether experiencing tensions 
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Table 2: Do the Cases Fit the Lofland Stark Model? 8 
Neutralized 
Pr evious Turning Affective Extra-Cult Intensive 
Tensions Dispositions Seekership Po int Bonds Attachments Interaction 
Church of 
the Sun Yes Yes Yes ~ Yes Yes Yes 
Christ 
Communal no e vi-
Organization Yes Yes Yes dence Yes Yes Yes 
Crusade House 
" 
~ No 
" 
Yes No Yes 
Divine Light 
Mission Yes Yes Ye s Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Unification Churchb Yes 
" 
Yes Ye s Yes Yes Yes 
Hare Krishna Yes Yes Yes Ye s Yes Yes Yes 
Levites Ye s Ye s No no e v i- Yes No Yes 
dence 
Mormons No No No No No No no evi-
dence 
Nich i r en Sh oshu Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes 
UFO Cult No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
a. Classifying the cases has involved so many " judgement calls," that these can n ot be noted here. Readers are 
referred to the original studies, from which they may draw their own conclusions. 
b. Lofland (1978) r eevaluated his original process model on the basis o f changes wh ich had occurred in the recruit-
lllent practices o f the Unificat ion Church. Our classification here is based on the 1978 reeva luation. 
distinguishes converts from non-converts. Although Heirich (1977:664-65) found that many 
of his respondents who had become involved in the Catholic Pentacostal movement did 
report high levels of tension, this did not differentiate them in any significant way from 
a matched sample of non-Pentacostals. Similarly, Richardson et aL, (1978:49) report that 
many recruits to Christ Communal Organization experienced tension but add that this 
was probably true of all youth in the sixties. Even Lofland and Stark admit in their original 
study that the problems experienced by their converts may not be qualitatively different 
from those experienced by other people (1965:867). All they assert is that converts 
experience these problems more severely and over longer time spans. Picking up on this, 
Snow and Phillips (1980:435) argue that what distinguishes converts from non-converts 
is not that they experience a higher level of tension but that they have a greater tendency 
to reexamine their biographies in order to find evidence of discontent prior to conversion. 
In other words, Snow and Phillips are suggesting that reports of tension may be better 
treated as evidence of retrospective reinterpretation of converts' histories than as actual 
evidence of converts' feeling-states prior to conversion. It should perhaps be noted in 
passing that there is a tradition of conversion studies (which we refer to later in this essay 
as the "organizational approach") which does not assume the importance of felt tension 
in the conversion process (see, for example, Gerlach and Hine, 1968). 
It is interesting to note in this context that three cases where evidence of tension 
prior to recruitment was absent are the three cases where we seem the least justified in 
talking about conversion. Seggar and Kunz, are, in their study of Mormons, really talking 
about recruitment rather than identity change and present no evidence that any type 
of attitude change or identity change has, in fact, taken place among their "converts." 
Balch and Taylor (1978:60) report that the phenomenon they observed in the UFO cult 
should not be thought of as conversion since they found no evidence of drastic change 
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among recruits who were already familiar with the "cultic milieu." Austin (1977:284-85) 
found that not all people who became residents of Crusade House experienced this as 
a drastic change in behavior and that it was only among those that did experience it as 
such that high levels of tension were reported. While one might argue that this proves 
that tension is a precondition for a radical change in identity, one might equally well argue 
that it merely proves that a feeling of radical change is a precondition to the perception 
of tension. 
We are not suggesting here that converts to these groups did not experience tension. 
We assert only that evidence of tension based on retrospective accounts is not very 
convincing. It should be pointed out that the one study of which we are aware that actually 
measured tension during the conversion process (Galanter, 1980:1579) did find that 
participants in a Unification Church workshop scored lower on a well-being scale than 
a matched population of non-members. 
RELIGIOUS PROBLEM-SOLVING PERSPECTIVE 
When Lofland and Stark argue that a religious problem-solving perspective is a 
precondition to conversion, they are trying to make the point that the converts' previous 
cognitive orientations will make them more or less likely to accept the ideology of a 
particular group. A number of students of religious conversion have argued that this is 
the case (Gordon, 1974; Grell, 1977; Harrison, 1974; Richardson, 1978; Richardson et aL, 
1978, 1979). The work of Richardson and his associates (1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981) 
on conversion trajectories also implies that predispositions are an important factor to 
consider in attempting to understand the conversion process. All but one of the case studies 
examined here report some degree of disposition to accepts a group's ideology prior to 
coming into contact with the group. For example, Lynch (1978:100) reports that two-thirds 
of the members of the Church of the Sun had read at least one book on the occult before 
coming in contact with the group. Baer (1978:291) reports that over 95 percent of his 
Levite respondents had had a religious problem-solving perspective prior to contact with 
the group. Snow and Phillips' (1980) study of Nichiren Shoshu offers us the best example 
of a group whose members do not seem to have espoused a religious problem-solving 
perspective prior to conversion, and even here, one might argue, the evidence is less than 
conclusive, since the measures Snow and Phillips chose made it unlikely that they would 
find evidence of the existence of a disposition to find Nichiren Shoshu ideology appealing. 
But perhaps we should not make too much of this finding that converts seem to be 
predisposed to joining the movements that they join. First of all, the finding is not all 
that surprising; what we are saying, in effect, is that people join religious movements 
whose ideologies make sense to them, and, after all, who could really expect otherwise? 
Second, one might well argue that there are few world-views in existence which do not 
share some elements with one another. If this is the case, then, finding some kind of 
match-up between old world-view and new is just a question of looking hard enough. Third, 
in cases of "alternation," the proposition that individuals will espouse ideologies compatible 
with their previous dispositions is true by definition. If people have changed from one 
system of beliefs to another which is not radically different, then it is tautological to say 
that there must be similarities between old beliefs and new. 
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We are aware of several studies of new religious movements which compare the 
world-views, attitudes and psychological states of people who join a particular group to 
those of people who do not. Galanter (1980: 1578) found that individuals who joined the 
"Moonies" had stronger affiliative needs than individuals who attended a workshop, but 
did not join. In a different study of "Moonies", Barker (1981) finds a number of cognitive 
and emotional variables which distinguish converts both from people who attended a 
workshop and from a control group which was not connected to the Unification Church. 
Barker's data suggests that the role of previous dispositions may vary according to the 
recruitment strategies and structure of the group with which the potential convert has 
come in contact. More studies of this type will have to be conducted before we may 
accurately assess the importance of previous dispositions to the conversion process. 
SEEKERSHIP 
We find evidence in six out of ten cases of some pattern of religious seekership and 
it is possible that in some of the other cases (e.g., Snow and Phillips, 1980), the reason 
that no evidence of seekership was found is that the researchers did not look very hard 
for it. 
A pattern of seekership seems more likely to precede conversion when the group 
involved advocates a communal lifestyle, when the group involved is stigmatized by the 
community at large and when conversion involves a radical discontinuity of social roles. 
The majority of the groups in which no pattern of seekership was found are those in which 
the process of change found within the groups is better described as "alternation" than 
as "conversion." 
It should be noted that the patterns of seekership described in the case studies we 
examined do not always support our "true believer" stereotype of the religious seeker. 
The "seekers" described in the case studies are not anomie fanatics frantically chasing 
after meaning, but rather people who seem curious about religious and/or occult matters. 
Richardson et al., (1978:48) report members of the Christ Communal Organization had 
been "looking for something" prior to conversion, but they do not say that they were 
looking frantically or desperately. Before joining the UFO cult, (Balch and Taylor, 1978:51, 
57), "converts" viewed themselves as "metaphysical seekers," but seekership seems to 
have been a role with which they were quite comfortable. Downton (1980) in his study 
of Divine Light Mission emphasizes the casualness of the seekership phase as well as 
the gradualness of the conversion process as whole. 
TURNING POINT 
Most of the individuals described by the case studies we examined report that contact 
with the group with which they affiliated came at a turning point in their lives. The one 
case where we find no evidence of people experiencing a "turning point" is the case (Seggar 
and Kunz, 1972) where we seem least justified in talking about "conversion." But as Snow 
and Phillips (1980:439) point out, we must be cautious about accepting such evidence at 
face value. All of the factors which make us unwilling to accept "a state of accutely-felt 
tension" as a prerequisite to conversion make us equally unwilling to incorporate the idea 
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of the necessity of a social or psychological turning point. The problem of how to interpret 
people's accounts of their conversions is again relevant here. When people tell us that 
their conversions came at turning points in their lives, are they giving us factual accounts 
of events as they occurred, or are they reconstructing their biographies in such a way 
as to justify their conversions? After all, if conversion is experienced as a radical 
transformation of identity, behavior and life, then it follows logically that it must have 
come at a turning point in one's life. In the convert's eyes, it is the fact of the experience 
of conversion that defines the turning point as a turning point. 
AFFECTIVE BONDS 
The formation of affective bonds within the group seems to be an important part 
of the conversion process in eight out of the ten cases we have been examining. Seggar 
and Kunz (1972:182) report that the formation of affective bonds does not seem to be 
an important feature in affiliation to Mormonism among their sample of "converts," but 
it is doubtful that we are really dealing with conversion in this case anyway. Balch and 
Taylor (1978) do not find either the preexistence or formation of affective bonds among 
converts to the UFO cult, but there were specific features of the structure and ideology 
of the group that discouraged the formation of such ties. 
NEUTRALIZATION OF EXTRA-CULT ATTACHMENTS 
In six of our ten cases we find that conversion is associated with the absence or 
neutralization of affective bonds outside the group. Neutralization of extra-cult 
attachments seems most important in groups where conversion involves a radical 
transformation of social roles and where conversion involves the sacrifice of social 
respectability. The only "respectable" group in which we find an absence of affective bonds 
is the Church of Sun (Lynch, 1978:105). We find here little pressure on converts from 
either within the group or outside it to give up attachments with non-members; rather, 
it seems that we are dealing here with a group whose members never had very many 
close personal ties to begin with. 
Our data support Snow and Phillips' (1980:442) contention that neutralization of 
extra-cult attachments will be an important part of the conversion process primarily in 
the context of "deviant" groups. Our data also support the argument of Richardson and 
Stewart (1978) that severing of extra-cult ties will be important only in those cases where 
significant others are not likely to support the convert's new perspective. They suggest 
that if significant others do support the convert's new perspective, then the presence of 
extra-cult ties will facilitate conversion. Presumably, converts to groups which are 
stigmatized and which involve a radical discontinuity in social roles will be less likely 
to find support for their new perspective among significant others. 
INTENSIVE INTERACTION 
Intensive interaction with other members of the group seems to be an important part 
of the conversion process in all ten cases. The one apparent exception to this generalization 
This content downloaded from 149.84.149.43 on Tue, 3 Feb 2015 08:37:17 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PROCESS MODELS OF CONVERSION 317 
is the UFO cult (Balch and Taylor, 1978) where a high degree of interpersonal interaction 
was not encouraged, but even here an extremely high level of commitment was demanded 
and members were required to make the group the central focus of all action. Thus, a 
building up of personal commitment through the creation of a high level of involvement 
with group goals was found in all ten cases. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Conceptual weaknesses with the formulation of three of Lofland and Stark's seven 
prerequisites for conversion (e.g., "tensions," "religious problem-solving perspective," and 
"turning point") make us unwilling to place too much credence in data from our case studies 
which speak to these aspects of the model. We turn then to an examination of the 
circumstances under which the remaining four proposed elements in the model 
("seekership," "affective bonds," "neutralization of extra-cult attachments," and "intensive 
interaction") will be present. 
Lofland and Stark's original process model was based on observations of a group 
which was regarded as deviant by society at large and which demanded of new members 
a radical change in social roles. Those studies which have found the Lofland-Stark model 
most adequate have been those which have addressed themselves to movements which 
share these features. Thus, the Lofland and Stark model seems to describe accurately 
the religious conversion process as it occurs in one organizational context. Where it has 
not proven to be an adequate description, this may not be because the model is a bad 
one but because the organizational context has been different from which Lofland and 
Stark observed. 
It may prove profitable to over-simplify the differences among the groups examined 
here into two ideal-types. Type One includes groups which, like the Unification Church, 
are stigmatized and involve a radical discontinuity of social roles. (In addition to the 
Unification Church, the "purest" examples of this type are Hare Krishna and Divine Light 
Mission). Type Two includes groups, like Crusade House, the Levites and Nichiren Shoshu, 
which are not stigmatized and which do not sponsor a drastic transformation of social 
roles. Seekership and the neutralization of extra-cult attachments seem to be prerequisites 
for conversion in the context of Type One groups but not in the context of Type Two 
groups. The reasons for these differences are not hard to understand. Groups which allow 
or encourage members to continue to pursue activities in the "outside world" are capable 
of recruiting new members via pre-existing social networks (Snow et aL, 1980; Rockford, 
1982; Grell and Rudy, 1984). In such groups, new recruits may make contact with the 
group through friends, relatives, and acquaintances who are already members. It stands 
to reason that in such cases, seekership is less likely to be a prerequisite to conversion 
than in situations where the activities of group members tend to be focused within the 
confines of the group. In Type Two groups, it is quite easy for potential recruits to happen 
upon a group even if they are not actively involved in the seekership role; in Type One 
groups, it seems less likely that individuals will encounter the group unless they have 
defined themselves as being "in the market" for conversion. 
There are two possible reasons why the neutralization of extra-cult attachments seems 
important to the conversion process in the context of Type One groups but not in the 
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context of Type Two groups. First, since Type One groups involve a radical discontinuity 
of social roles, joining a group of this type almost by definition entails breaking off contacts 
with individuals with whom one associated in previous roles. The second reason has been 
alluded to earlier in this essay. Type One groups expouse world-views and/or lifestyles 
which are seen as deviant by the society at large. If members are to hold fast to deviant 
world-views or lifestyles, it may be necessary to insulate them from contact with former 
significant others who might discredit them. Since the world-views and lifestyes of Type 
Two groups are less likely to be seen as deviant by the "outside world" it may be less 
necessary for these groups to try to sever affective bonds between new converts and non-
members. Galanter (1980:1578) found that a crucial difference between people who joined 
the Unification Church and those who toyed with the idea of membership but did not 
join was that the latter group had more "outside affiliations" than the former group. Long 
and Hadden (1983) have attributed problems experienced by the Unification Church in 
retaining members to shortcomings in the group's socialization techniques; we would argue 
that these problems may be due rather to the difficulties inherent in the trying to maintain 
the boundary between members and non-members (Grell and Rudy, 1984). 
Regardless of organization context, two elements of the Lofland-Stark model seem 
to be crucial to the conversion process; these are affective bonds and intensive interation 
with group members. Snow and Phillips (1980:444) have asserted that "the interactive 
process holds the key to understanding conversion." Our findings lead us to support this 
conclusion. Our evidence suggests to us that the crucial dynamic in the conversion process 
is the process of coming to see oneself as one's reference group sees one, of coming to 
see that reality is what one's friends say it is. (Lofland and Stark, 1965:871; Stark and 
Bainbridge, 1980). The formation of affective ties and intensive interaction within the 
group became all-important because it is through becoming commited to an organization 
and the people in it that an individual becomes converted to the organization's perspective. 
Organizations which seek to foster the conversion process all seek to create an 
atmosphere in which potential converts are encouraged to interact with those who may 
be expected to support their new world-view and discouraged from interacting with those 
who might be expected to challenge that world-view. Because they are perceived as deviant, 
Type One groups may find it neccessary to regulate contact between members and 
non-members to a greater extent than do Type Two Groups. Nonetheless, in our view, 
the essential dynamic of the conversion process remains the same: conversion is a process 
whereby one comes eventually to see the world from the perspective of one's new reference 
group. Any religious group which is to be successful in facilitating the conversion of recruits 
will need to be structured in such a way as to foster intensive interaction among group 
members. 
It should be noted here that there is nothing specifically "religious" about this process; 
any group which intends to encourage identity change among its members will be likely 
to be structured along similar lines. Elsewhere (Grell and Rudy, 1983, 1984), we have 
discussed at greater length the common features which we believe are to be found in all 
"Identity Transforming Organizations." 
Because conversion takes place in different organizational contexts, it is foolhardy 
to expect that a process model like the one proposed by Lofland and Stark will accurately 
describe the conversion process. There is no such thing as the conversion process; rather, 
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there are as many conversion processes as there are organizational contexts in which 
conversion takes place. As stated earlier, Lofland hi.mseH has encouraged researchers to 
develop their own qualitative process-models of conversion instead of slavishly applying 
his (1978:21). In a more recent piece Lofland and Skonovd (1981) have outlined six different 
"conversion motifs." In our opinion, there is little to be gained from such a proliferation 
of process-models. Nor are we sympathetic to attempts to save the Lofland-Stark Model 
by making it more general (Austin, 1977; Bankston et aL, 1981). The problem with the 
Lofland-Stark model is not that it is not general enough; the problem with it is that it 
is a process-model. Process-models are descriptive models which attempt to describe ideal· 
type sequences in which given phenomena generally develop. If the interactive process 
is indeed the key to understanding conversion, then, it would seem advisable to abandon 
the search for the sequence or set of sequences that best describes the conversion process 
in favor of an attempt to grasp the dynamics of the social interaction that is the essence 
of conversion. 
We conclude this essay by noting briefly the relationship between the approach to 
conversion which we are espousing and others currently being done in this field. 
We may have given the impression in this essay that all studies of the process of 
recruitment and conversion to new religious groups have employed a process-model 
approach. This is not the case. At least three other approaches can be discerned among 
the relatively large number of conversion studies that have appeared in recent years. The 
approach with which our concluding remarks are most compatible is one which Balch 
(1979) refers to as the "structural-functional" approach but which we prefer to call the 
organizational approach. This approach emphasizes the way in which organizational 
patterns of interaction are structured so as to encourage the acceptance of a new world 
view (Kanter, 1968, 1972; Gerlach and Hine,1968; Hine,1970; Bomley and Shupe, 1979b; 
Harrison, 1974; Lofland, 1978; Richardson et aL, 1979; Grell and Rudy, 1983, 1984; Balch, 
1979). The second approach, which Strauss (1976, 1979) has called the "subjectivist" 
approach and which Long and Hadden (1983) have called the "drift" approach,3 
concentrates on the way social actors go about constructing for themselves the role of 
convert (Lofland, 1978; Lofland and Skonovd, 1981; Strauss •. 1976, 1979; Balch, 1979; 
Bromley and Shupe, 1979a; Taylor, 1976; Richardson, 1982). The third approach is the 
brainwashing approach (Clark,1979; Conway and Siegelman, 1978; Enroth,1977; Patrick 
and Dulack, 1976; Singer, 1979; Stoner and Parke, 1977). This approach argues that the 
explanation for conversion is to be found in the unorthodox psychological techniques 
employed by "cults." Sociologists, expecially those writing from within the subjectivist 
tradition (Robbins and Anthony, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1982; Richardson, 1982; Shupe and 
Bromley, 1979) have criticized the brainwashing approach to conversion, charging that 
it is better understood as an ideological justification for opposition to new religious 
movements than as a social scientific tool for understanding them. This is not the place 
for a detailed evaluation of the brainwashing approach to conversion. Suffice it to say 
that the brainwashing approach's insistance that there is something psychologically unique 
about the process of conversion to deviant religious groups stands in direct contrast to 
the organizational approach we have advocated here. Our analysis suggests that conversion 
is to be explained by the same concepts that sociologists employ to illuminate any 
socialization process; the difference between conversion and other kinds of socialization 
lies not in psychological processes involved but in the organizational context in which 
I 
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it takes place. We agree with the assertion of Long and Hadden (1983:13) that conversion 
ought to be studied as one type of socialization activity. 
Long and Hadden (1983) have suggested that the apparent contradiction between 
the "drift" approach to conversion and the brainwashing approach may be resolved. The 
brainwashing approach, in their view, emphasizes the organizational presures placed upon 
potential converts while . the drift approach emphasizes the voluntaristic nature of 
conversion and the precariousness of commitment. They argue that there is no logical 
contradiction between an approach that emphasizes the importance of the individual and 
an approach that emphasizes organizational pressures on the individual. Long and 
Hadden are right to assert that there is no inherent incompatibility between these 
two approaches, but they are wrong to equate the brainwashing approach with the 
organizational approach. The brainwashing approach posits a radical discontinuity between 
conversion and other socialization processes; it is the organizational approach that 
emphasizes the social context of conversion. 
We agree with Long and Hadden that an emphasis on the situational context of 
identity transformation is not incompatible with the recognition that people creatively 
work out their own identities. To see identity transformation as the willful act of individuals 
trying to solve problems of living is not necessarily to deny that social situations pose 
the problems that must be solved and help to channel the directions that people take 
in trying to solve them. 
In our opinion both the organizational approach and the subjectivist approach promise 
to enhance our understanding of the conversion process. Future research must focus on 
the ways in which individuals construct new identities in different types of organizational 
settings. And, if future research is to be directed toward understanding the conversion 
process in different social settings, then it is imperative that researchers begin to develop 
data collection and classification procedures amenable to the kind of cross-group 
comparisons that we have attempted in this essay. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. If any readers are aware of other cases that fit our criteria for inclusion in this study, the authors would 
appreciate it if they would bring these to our attention. 
2. We are indebted to Melinda Bollar Wagner for pointing out to us in personal conversation the importance 
of this distinction. 
3. The approach Long and Hadden call "drift" seems to incorporate both the process· model approach and the 
subjectivist approach. 
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